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Lost	in	Math?	J.	Butterfield,	Trinity	College,	Cambridge	UK:	jb56@cam.ac.uk	
Saturday	2	February	2019		Review	for	Physics	in	Perspective	of:		
Lost	in	Math:	How	Beauty	Leads	Physics	Astray,		by	Sabine	Hossenfelder.	Basic	Books	2018.			ISBN:	978-0-465-09425-7,	304	pages,	$17.99	(hardcover)			
Abstract:		This	is	a	review	of	Hossenfelder’s	book,	Lost	in	Math:	How	Beauty	Leads	Physics	Astray.	The	book	gives	a	breezy	exposition	of	the	present	situation	in	fundamental	physics,	and	raises	important	questions:	both	about	the	content	of	the	physics,	and	the	way	physics	research	is	organized.	I	first	state	my	main	disagreements.	Then,	I	mostly	praise	the	book:	I	concentrate	on	Hossenfelder’s	discussion	of	supersymmetry,	naturalness	and	the	multiverse.			
1.	Introduction	This	book	(Hossenfelder	2018)	is	an	engaging	popular	account	of	the	present	situation	in	fundamental	physics.	It	is	also	a	strong	critique	of	that	situation.		All	credit	to	Sabine	Hossenfelder	for	writing	a	book	which---while	personal,	indeed	passionate---is	unpretentious	and	humorous.	She	is	a	theoretical	physicist	in	Frankfurt,	who	also	writes	an	excellent	blog	about	physics	at:	http://backreaction.blogspot.co.uk.	Thus	the	book	is	written	in	a	breezy	style.	It	is	both	an	essay	on	the	present	situation	in	fundamental	physics,	and	a	memoir	of	her	travels	in	recent	years,	conducting	extended	interviews	with	about	a	dozen	physicists,	including	for	example:	Nima	Arkani-Hamed,	George	Ellis,	Gordy	Kane,	Garrett	Lisi,	Keith	Olive,	Joe	Polchinski,	Steven	Weinberg	and	Frank	Wilczek.			Their	remarks	are	reproduced	in	extenso,	interweaved	with	Hossenfelder’s	thoughts.	These	are	often	appealingly	ironic	and-or	self-deprecating.	For	example,	when	Polchinski	compliments	her	by	saying:	‘I	think	you	have	tried	very	hard	to	separate	between	ideas	that	sound	like	good	ideas	and	ideas	that	do	not	seem	like	good	ideas	…	It’s	an	important	thing	to	do.	It’s	really	thankless,	though,	because	the	number	of	bad	ideas	increases	much	more	rapidly	than	the	number	of	good	ideas	...’;	Hossenfelder	adds:	‘This	is	possibly	the	nicest	way	I’ve	ever	been	told	I’m	stupid’	(p.	177).			In	short,	the	book	is	engaging,	easy	to	read,	and	gives	vivid	explanations	of	the	issues:	as	I	will	try	to	convey	with	some	quotes.	And	of	course,	the	views	of	these	interviewees	are	bound	to	be	interesting,	especially	to	readers	of	this	journal.				Hossenfelder’s	criticisms	of	the	present	situation	in	physics	fall	into	two	main	groups.	The	first	group	concerns	the	content	of	recent	proposals	in	fundamental	physics;	the	second,	the	professional	and	institutional	organization	of	physics.	Hossenfelder	devotes	most	of	the	book	to	the	first	group.	Here,	she	emphasizes	supersymmetry,	naturalness	and	the	multiverse.	She	sees	all	three	as	wrong	turns	that	physics	has	made;	and	as	having	a	common	motivation---the	pursuit	of	mathematical	beauty.	Hence	her	sub-title.	She	discusses	the	second	group	of	
	 2	
criticisms	at	the	end	of	the	book,	along	with	recommendations	about	how	we	could,	and	should,	change	our	ways.			I	will	follow	suit.	I	will	emphasize	the	first	group,	especially	supersymmetry,	naturalness	and	the	multiverse	(Sections	3	to	9).	I	will	turn	only	in	the	final	two	Sections	(10	and	11)	to	the	organization	of	physics.	But	I	begin	by	registering	my	main	disagreements	with	her	(Section	2).			
2.	Disagreements		I	am	persuaded	by	much	of	what	Hossenfelder	says.	In	some	ways,	this	is	unsurprising.	For	one	main	theme	of	her	second	group	of	criticisms	is	that	research	in	fundamental	physics	concentrates	unduly	on	a	few	problems	and	research	programmes,	and	should	instead	be	more	diverse;	and	it	is	easy	to	agree	to	that.	Also,	one	main	theme	of	her	first	group	of	criticisms	is	that	the	present	difficulties,	even	defects,	of	fundamental	physics	are	partly	due	to	a	cavalier	attitude	to	some	philosophical	issues,	such	as	confirmation	and	explanation.	Being	a	philosopher,	I	of	course	find	it	easy	to	agree	to	that.		But	as	everyone	knows:	you	cannot	expect	a	philosopher	(or	a	book-reviewer)	to	agree	completely.	Thus	I	have	two	main	kinds	of	disagreement:	the	first	is	general,	the	second	specifically	about	beauty.			In	general,	people	are	bound	to	differ	in	how	they	weigh	the	merits---the	achievements	hitherto,	and	the	future	prospects---of	a	given	research	programme;	even	when	they	are	experts	with	matching	knowledge	of	the	programme’s	technicalities.	And	so	also,	as	regards	comparing	the	merits	of	different	research	programmes.		Similarly,	for	the	merits	of	general	‘framework’	ideas	like	naturalness,	as	against	fully-fledged	research	programmes.	And	similarly	for	open	problems:	people	are	bound	to	differ	about	their	merits,	i.e.	about	how	fruitful	it	would	be	to	now	address	the	problem.	Thus	for	all	that	Hossenfelder	says:	one	undoubtedly	could	mount	a	robust	and	detailed	defence	of	some	(perhaps	all?)	of	the	programmes	and	ideas	she	criticizes.			For	example,	consider	supersymmetry.	As	we	will	see,	Hossenfelder’s	main	criticism	of	supersymmetry	is,	in	short,	that	it	is	advocated	because	of	its	beauty,	but	is	unobserved.	But	even	if	supersymmetry	is	not	realized	in	nature,	one	might	well	defend	studying	it	as	an	invaluable	tool	for	getting	a	better	understanding	of	quantum	field	theories.			A	similar	defence	might	well	be	given	for	studying	string	theory.	In	fact,	Hossenfelder	does	not	give	an	extended	discussion	of	string	theory.	As	I	said,	she	focuses	on	supersymmetry,	naturalness	and	the	multiverse;	and	for	the	first	of	these,	she	stresses	supersymmetry	in	extensions	of	the	standard	model,	not	in	string	theory.	Agreed:	she	does	intermittently	mention	string	theory’s	lack	of	empirical	confirmation	and	the	beauty	of	its	mathematics;	and	she	briefly	quotes	practitioners	saying,	some	twenty	or	thirty	years	ago,	that	its	beauty	suggests	it	‘had	to	be	pointing	to	something	deep’	(thus	John	Schwarz,	on	p.	189).	But	I	think	
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many	practitioners,	especially	nowadays,	would	not	motivate	string	theory	by	appealing	to	beauty.	Indeed,	all	agree	that	it	is	a	very	complicated	framework	with	many	different	types	of	fields,	gauge	groups,	symmetries	etc.	(See	below	on	how	judgments	of	beauty	are	historically	conditioned	and	fallible.)	Rather,	they	would	appeal	to	many	technical	features:	such	as	how	its	various	intellectual	technologies	(mostly	rooted	in	quantum	field	theory)	enable	one	(i)	to	do	many	calculations	of	obvious	relevance	to	quantum	gravity,	e.g.	about	black	holes,	and	(ii)	to	address	long-standing	issues,	such	as	improving	the	ultra-violet	behaviour	of	gravity.			Or	consider	the	cosmological	multiverse.	Here,	Hossenfelder’s	main	criticism	is,	I	think,	not	simply	that	the	multiverse	is	unobservable:	that	is,	the	other	pocket	universes	(domains)	apart	from	our	own	are	unobservable.	That	is,	obviously,	‘built	in’	to	the	proposal;	and	so	can	hardly	count	as	a	knock-down	objection.	The	criticism	is,	rather,	that	we	have	very	little	idea	how	to	confirm	a	theory	postulating	such	a	multiverse.	To	which	the	reply	will	be	that,	agreed,	it	is	fearfully	difficult	to	do	so:	but	there	are	various	ideas	in	the	literature	about	how	to	do	so,	and	so	one	should	just	dive	in	and	assess,	and	try	to	improve,	them.	In	particular,	we	should	recognize	that	although	some	cosmologists	are	cavalier	about	what	confirmation	of	a	multiverse	would	amount	to:	many	others	show	a	reflective	and	nuanced	engagement	with	the	question,	and	related	philosophical	issues	like	explanation.	So	philosophers,	and	other	readers	of	this	book,	should	resist	inferring	that	the	cosmology	community	as	a	whole	needs,	so	to	speak,	to	take	a	course	in	philosophy	of	science.	There	is	a	wealth	of	conceptual,	indeed	philosophical,	discussion	by	practitioners	that	is	not	only	clear-headed	but	also	inventive.		My	specific	disagreement	is	about	beauty:	i.e.	the	criticism	stated	by	the	sub-title,	that	the	pursuit	of	mathematical	beauty	has	led	physics	astray.	But	for	clarity,	I	should	begin	with	an	agreement.	Hossenfelder	is	not	concerned	with	individual,	perhaps	idiosyncratic,	judgments	of	beauty	(or	of	related	ideas,	like	elegance	and	simplicity):	but	rather,	with	judgments	common	to	a	scientific	community.	And	rightly	so:	it	is	such	communal	judgments,	not	individual	ones,	that	play	a	significant	role	in	choosing	which	scientific	theory	to	endorse	or	to	pursue.			This	is	one	reason	why	it	is	not	helpful	to	label	appeals	to	beauty	as	‘subjective’.	Recall	Kuhn’s	wise	remarks	about	the	perils	of	this	word	(1977,	pp.	333f.).	Incidentally,	his	essay’s	main	point	is	that	the	criteria	for	theory	choice	usually	invoked---Kuhn	lists	five:	accuracy,	broad	scope,	consistency	(both	internal	and	with	other	theories),	simplicity	and	fruitfulness---cannot	be	parlayed	up	into	a	precise	algorithm	for	choosing	theories.	For	scientists	are	bound	to	differ	in	how	to	make	them	precise	in	any	single	application,	and	in	how	to	weigh	them	when	they	conflict.		That	is	surely	true.	And	it	is	of	course	the	basis	of	my	first,	general,	disagreement	with	Hossenfelder:	since	people	are	bound	to	differ,	there	can	be	no	definitive	reasons	to	reject	research	programmes,	such	as	string	theory,	or	framework	ideas,	such	as	supersymmetry.				But	I	disagree	with	Hossenfelder	about	what	the	physics	community	takes	the	heuristic	role	of	judgments	of	beauty	(and	of	related	ideas,	like	elegance)	to	be.	
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As	we	will	see	(Section	4),	she	argues	convincingly	that	such	judgments:	(i)	are	strongly	influenced	by	history,	especially	by	what	has	been	successful	in	past	theories;	and	(ii)	are	thoroughly	fallible.	So	I	think	those	who	appeal	to	beauty	in	physical	theorizing	must	admit	these	limitations;	as	must,	indeed,	anyone	who	considers	the	topic.			But	here’s	the	rub---how	I	disagree	with	Hossenfelder.	I	also	think	advocates	of	beauty	as	a	heuristic	do	admit	these	limitations.	They	advocate	no	more	than	a	historically	conditioned,	and	fallible,	heuristic.		(Recall	my	comment	that	string	theorists	agree	their	theory	is	complicated,	and	its	merits	largely	technical.)		In	short,	I	think	Hossenfelder	interprets	physicists	as	more	gung-ho,	more	naïve,	that	beauty	is	a	guide	to	truth	than	they	really	are.			But	enough	of	these	cavils.	This	is	a	popular	book,	not	an	academic	one.	So	it	can	seem	nit-picking	for	me	to	emphasize	that	the	programmes	and	ideas	criticized	have	plenty	to	say	in	their	defence.	Of	course	they	do.	And	I	do	not	doubt	that	Hossenfelder,	in	an	academic	modus	operandi,	would	concede	that	such	defences	have	weight:	though	of	course,	how	much	weight	is	a	delicate,	detailed	and	inevitably	controversial,	affair.	So	having	registered	my	disagreements,	I	will	from	now	on	enter	the	spirit	of	the	book---starting	with	how	Hossenfelder	sketches	the	present	situation	in	physics.				
3.	Has	physics	lost	its	way?		The	background	to	Hossenfelder’s	accusation,	that	fundamental	physics	has	lost	its	way,	will	be	familiar.		In	the	last	forty	years	we	have	successfully	applied	the	basic	frameworks	of	quantum	field	theory	and	general	relativity	in	regimes	far	beyond	those	for	which	they	were	originally	conceived.	Here	‘far	beyond’	means	several	orders	of	magnitude	in	some	relevant	scale	such	as	distance,	energy	or	field-strength.	To	take	just	one	example	from	some	thirty	years	ago:	recall	the	1993	Nobel	prize,	awarded	to	Taylor	and	Hulse.	Their	analysis	of	data	from	a	binary	pulsar	tested	general	relativity	for	gravitational	fields	10,000	times	stronger	than	the	solar	system	tests---and	confirmed	it	to	some	ten	decimal	places.	The	overall	result	of	this	and	many	similar	triumphs	is	ironic.	Namely,	that	now,	these	great	framework	theories,	quantum	field	theory	and	general	relativity,	are	victims	of	their	own	success.	For	we	need	to	go	beyond	them,	since	they	face	various	technical	and	conceptual	problems:	such	as	the	hierarchy	and	cosmological	constant	problems.	But	we	are	in	dire	need	of	clues	about	how	to	do	so.			Thus	it	is	often	said	(including	in	this	book)	that	we	need	data	that	shows	some	‘chink	in	the	armour’	of	these	theories:	some	empirical	mismatch	that	enables	us	to	get	a	bridgehead	for	making	further	progress.	And	the	size	of	the	particle	accelerators	that	now	seem	to	be	needed	to	gather	any	such	data	is	so	enormous	as	to	make	them	astronomically	expensive.	Indeed,	‘astronomically’	can	here	be	understood	literally:	Hossenfelder	mentions	(p.	178)	that	to	reach	Planckian	
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energies	directly	(i.e.	with	the	current	framework	for	accelerator	design)	we	would	need	an	accelerator	about	the	size	of	the	Milky	Way.			And	we	are	also	in	dire	need	of	conceptual	clues.	The	standard	illustration	here	is	how	the	null	result	of	the	Michelson-Morley	experiment	presaged	special	relativity’s	abandonment	of	absolute	simultaneity.	More	precisely,	to	register	the	fact	that	the	result	seems	not	to	have	influenced	Einstein:	the	null	result	could	have	been	used	as	such	a	clue.		So	perhaps	the	present	situation	is	similar.	Maybe	some	empirical	facts	crucial	to	solving	today’s	main	problems	are	already	to	hand,	but	our	current	conceptual	outlook	prevents	us	recognizing	them.				 			These	obstacles,	both	empirical	(financial!)	and	conceptual,	to	making	progress	in	fundamental	physics,	get	rehearsed	in	the	book,	by	both	Hossenfelder	and	her	interviewees.	I	think	they	would	be	acknowledged	by	anyone	considering	the	present	state	of	physics.	So	a	case	can	be	made	that	in	the	last	forty	years,	fundamental	physics	has	got	stuck.		But	even	if	that	is	right:	it	is	one	thing	to	be	stuck,	and	another	thing	to	be	lost.	One	can	be	stuck---	stationary	and	unable	to	move---without	having	taken	a	wrong	turn.	Yet	Hossenfelder	argues	that	physics	has	indeed	taken	a	wrong	turn.	As	I	announced	in	Section	1,	she	makes	two	kinds	of	criticism.		First:	the	mentioned	obstacles	have	prompted	a	mistaken	appeal	to	beauty,	and	related	ideas	like	simplicity,	as	a	criterion	for	selecting	physical	theories.	And	second:	the	professional	and	institutional	organization	of	physics	has	gone	awry.	Hossenfelder	makes	a	good,	though	polemical,	case.	So	it	is	good	news	that	the	book	ends	with	suggestions	about	how	we	should	mend	our	ways.			Although	the	book’s	interviews	and	Chapters	tend	to	mingle	these	two	groups	of	criticisms,	the	first	gets	more	detailed	attention	and	more	pages.	And	I	shall	emphasize	the	first:	which	is	anyway	much	closer	to	philosophy,	my	home	ground.	So	in	Sections	4	to	9,	I	will	discuss	this	first	group,	emphasizing	the	three	topics:	supersymmetry,	naturalness,	and	the	multiverse.	This	group	of	criticisms	leads	in	to	the	second,	about	the	social	organization	of	physics:	which	I	discuss	in	Sections	10	and	11.		Finally,	I	will	endorse	some	of	the	book’s	closing	suggestions	about	how	we	could,	and	should,	‘do	better’.				
4.	The	dangers	of	beauty		It	is	of	course	sensible,	even	mandatory,	that	when	we	do	not	have	enough	evidence	to	decide	between	rival	theories,	we	must	use	other	criteria.	And	there	is	a	strong	tradition	that	physicists	should	seek	beauty	and-or	simplicity	in	their	equations:	a	desideratum	that	some,	such	as	Dirac	(p.	25),	prized	very	highly.	Besides,	in	approaching	an	intractable	physics	problem,	even	at	a	much	humbler	level	than	that	of	Dirac	and	his	ilk,	it	is	often	a	good	idea	to	seek	some	elegant	or	simple	formulation.	There	are	countless	elementary	examples,	such	as	using	a	symmetry	to	reduce	the	number	of	variables	in	a	problem,	and	finding	normal	coordinates.		
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	On	the	other	hand,	what	counts	as	beautiful,	simple	or	elegant	seems	to	be	in	the	eye	of	the	beholder,	in	physics	as	much	as	in	everyday	life.	At	least,	this	seems	true	as	regards	judgments	of	these	features	for	general	theories	as	against	individual	physics	problems.		That	is:	such	judgments	are	strongly	influenced	by	history,	i.e.	by	what	has	been	successful	in	past	theories---or	past	attempts	at	theories.		Indeed,	Hossenfelder	brings	up	(in	her	interviews	with	Weinberg	and	Wilczek:	pp.	128	and	152)	that	the	philosopher	James	McAllister	(1999)	argued	that	scientific	revolutions	overturn	scientists’	conceptions	of	what	counts	as	beautiful,	elegant	etc.	in	their	science.	Weinberg	and	Wilczek	say	they	are	sympathetic	to	this	view---as	they	surely	should	be.	A	closely	related	point	is	that	what	facts	count	as	needing	an	explanation	is	strongly	influenced	by	historical	circumstances.	An	example	which	Weinberg	himself	recalls	(p.	110)	is	Kepler’s	endeavour	to	explain	the	relative	sizes	of	the	planets’	orbits	by	interpolating	Platonic	solids	between	them:	sizes	that	we	now	accept	as	historical	accidents	of	how	the	solar	system	happens	to	have	evolved,	without	any	explanation	in	general	theory.			Examples	like	this	drive	home	the	lesson	that	although	we	might	select	a	theory	(or	something	more	preliminary:	an	attempt	at	a	theory)	by	its	beauty	or	elegance—especially	if	we	lack	evidence	for	it!---we	must	in	honesty	admit	that	any	such	judgment	of	beauty	etc.	has	three	great	limitations.	Namely:	(i)	it	is	very	much	‘by	our	lights’;	(ii)	it	is	fallible;	and	(iii)	it	has	no	logical,	or	in	any	way	secure,	connection	with	the	theory	being	true.	These	limitations	will	recur	in	the	following	Sections.	In	short,	the	lesson	is:	beware	of	the	slogan	‘too	good	not	to	be	true’.	Beware	temptation.									According	to	the	current	popular	image	of	fundamental	physics,	the	obvious	choice	of	a	target	for	this	warning	is	string	theory,	with	its	lack	of	empirical	confirmation	and	(alleged!)	beauty.	Thus	it	was	the	target	of	recent	books,	which	will	be	familiar	to	readers	of	this	journal:	Smolin’s	The	Trouble	with	Physics	(2006)	and	Woit’s	Not	Even	Wrong	(2006).	But	as	I	reported	in	Section	2,	Hossenfelder	discusses	string	theory	only	briefly.	She	and	her	interviewees	focus	on	three	other	targets---supersymmetry,	naturalness	and	the	multiverse:	though	they	each	feature	in	string	theory,	they	also	figure	prominently	outside	it.		As	to	supersymmetry,	which	is	a	family	of	symmetries	transposing	fermions	and	bosons:	the	main	point	is	not	merely	that	it	is	unobserved.	Rather,	it	is	unobserved	at	the	energies	recently	attained	at	the	LHC	at	which---one	should	not	say:	‘it	was	predicted	to	be	observed’;	but	so	to	speak---‘we	would	have	been	pleased	to	see	it’.	This	cautious	choice	of	words	reflects	the	connection	to	Hossenfelder’s	second	target:	naturalness,	or	in	another	jargon,	fine-tuning.	More	precisely,	these	labels	are	each	other’s	opposites:	naturalness	is,	allegedly,	a	virtue:	and	fine-tuning	is	the	vice	of	not	being	natural.			The	main	connection	between	supersymmetry	and	naturalness,	expounded	by	Hossenfelder,	concerns	the	mass	of	the	Higgs	boson.	There	is	intricate	advanced	physics	here,	which	Hossenfelder	explains	well	in	various	passages.	But	before	
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turning	to	that	in	Section	7,	I	will	consider	naturalness	in	general	terms,	in	the	next	two	Sections.					
5.	Three	kinds	of	naturalness		Naturalness	is,	I	submit,	a	cluster	of	ideas,	rather	than	a	single	one.	I	will	articulate	them	as	a	trio:	in	order	of	increasing	precision---and	perhaps	plausibility.	Of	course,	I	make	no	special	claim	for	my	trio:	one	might	well	explicate	and	disambiguate	‘naturalness’	differently.	For	detailed	philosophical	discussion,	I	recommend	Williams	(2015,	especially	Sections	3,4;	2018).	The	second	of	these	papers	develops	my	contrast	in	(iii)	below	between	typicality	as	having	moderate	or	higher	probability,	and	as	being	insensitive	to	the	details	of	(usually	unknown)	higher-energy	physics.	The	second	paper	also	relates	naturalness	to	my	third	theme,	the	multiverse.	In	any	case:	my	construal	of	naturalness	as	a	trio	runs	as	follows.			(i)	Against	coincidence:	There	should	be	some	explanation	of	the	value	of	a	
fundamental	physical	parameter.		Examples	of	such	parameters	are	the	charge	of	an	electron,	or	relatedly	the	fine	structure	constant.	These	are	traditional	examples,	owing	not	least	to	Eddington’s	famous---or	notorious---speculative	efforts	(which	he	called	‘Fundamental	Theory’)	to	provide	such	explanations.	The	contemporary	example	that	Hossenfelder	concentrates	on	(thanks	to	its	connection	with	SUSY)	is	the	mass	of	the	Higgs	boson	(cf.	Section	5).	But	whatever	the	example,	the	idea	here	is:	the	value	should	not	be	a	‘brute	fact’,	or	a	‘mere	matter	of	happenstance’,	or	a	‘numerical	coincidence’.			(ii)	Against	difference:	The	value	of	a	fundamental	physical	parameter	should	not	
be	an	arithmetical	difference	of	two	other	physically	significant	numbers	that	are	
nearly	equal	but	both	vastly	larger	in	magnitude	than	the	parameter	itself.		For	example:	imagine	a	theoretical	framework	in	which	the	chosen	parameter	p	is	10-6.	And	imagine	this	is	‘because’	(i.e.	because,	according	to	this	framework!)	p	is	the	difference	of	two	other	numbers,	q	and	r,	with	some	physically	significant	interpretations,	that	are	nearly	equal	but	both	vastly	larger	than	p:	e.g.	with	values	106	+10-6	and	106.	(Of	course,	as	Hossenfelder	explains	(pp.	64-65):	since	the	value	of	a	parameter	usually	depends	on	a	human	choice	of	units,	the	numbers	10-6	etc.	cited	here	need	to	be	suitably	dimensionless.)		So	the	framework	makes	the	value	of	our	chosen	parameter	p	fine-tuned.	It	is	extremely	sensitive	to	the	exact	values	of	these	other	numbers	q	and	r:	in	my	example,	sensitive	to	their	thirteenth	digit.	Had	q	and	r	been	slightly	different	(in	terms	of	proportions	of	their	actual	values),	then	p’s	value	would	have	been	vastly	different	(proportionately)	from	its	actual	value.	This	idea,	(ii),	is	clearly	a	special	case	of	(i).	For	the	value	of	p	being	such	a	difference	is	one	way	for	it	to	be	a	numerical	coincidence.	In	other	words:	the	presumed	theoretical	framework,	with	its	equation	p	=	q	–	r,	gives	only	an	unsatisfactorily	fragile	derivation	of	p’s	value,	not	a	robust	explanation	of	it.	And	as	we	will	see	in	Section	7,	contemporary	physics	gives	a	dramatic	example	of	
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this	uncomfortable	situation.	For	the	mass	of	the	Higgs	boson	is	just	such	a	parameter	p:	but	with	the	exponent	6	replaced	by	14!	That	is:	the	mass	is	a	difference	of	two	numbers	that,	written	in	decimal	notation,	match	in	their	first	
fourteen	digits,	and	then	differ	in	the	fifteenth	digit.		Note	finally	that	this	idea,	(ii),	is	also	a	special	case	in	another	regard.	For	arithmetical		difference	is	of	course	just	one	way	for	our	chosen	parameter	p	to	be	a	suspiciously	sensitive---a	fine-tuned---function	of	some	other	numbers.	This	leads	to	the	more	general	idea	in	(iii).			(iii)	For	typicality:	The	value	of	a	fundamental	physical	parameter	should	be	
typical,	in	some	precise	sense	defined	by	an	appropriate	theoretical	framework.		Physics	provides	two	overall	schemes	for	understanding	this	idea	of	typicality;	Hossenfelder	discusses	both.		One	is	general,	and	has	long	been	endemic	in	many	branches	of	physics.	Namely:	there	should	be	a	probability	distribution	over	the	possible	values	of	the	parameter,	and	the	actual	value	should	not	have	too	low	a	probability.	This	connects	of	course	with	orthodox	statistical	inference.	There,	it	is	standard	practice	to	say	that	if	a	probability	distribution	for	some	variable	is	hypothesized,	then	observing	the	value	of	a	variable	to	lie	‘in	the	tail	of	the	distribution’---to	have	‘a	low	likelihood’	(i.e.	low	probability,	conditional	on	the	hypothesis	that	the	distribution	is	correct)---disconfirms	the	hypothesis	that	the	distribution	is	the	correct	one:	i.e.	the	hypothesis	that	the	distribution	truly	governs	the	variable.	This	scheme	for	understanding	typicality	seems	to	me,	and	surely	most	interested	parties---be	they	physicists	or	philosophers---sensible,	perhaps	even	mandatory,	as	part	of	scientific	method.	Agreed:	questions	remain	about:		(a)	how	far	under	the	tail	of	the	distribution---how	much	of	an	outlier---an	observation	can	be	without	disconfirming	the	hypothesis,	i.e.	without	being	‘atypical’;		(b)	how	in	general	we	should	understand	‘confirm’	and	‘disconfirm’,	e.g.	whether	in	Bayesian	or	in	traditional	(Neyman-Pearson)	terms;	and	relatedly		(c)	whether	the	probability	distribution	is	subjective	or	objective;	or	more	generally,	what	probability	really	means.		But	these	questions	are	not	specific	to	fundamental	physics.	So	I	will	not	pursue	them	here,	and	nor	does	Hossenfelder.	But	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	they	are	easy,	or	that	they	‘can	be	safely	left	to	the	philosophers’.	At	the	end	of	this	Section,	and	again	in	Section	8	(about	the	multiverse),	we	shall	see	questions	(a)	and	(c)	return	to	haunt	us.	The	second	scheme	for	understanding	typicality	is	specific,	and	of	recent	vintage.	It	developed	as	part	of	the	effective	field	theory	‘vision’	that	came	from	Ken	Wilson’s	deep	re-thinking	of	renormalization	group	flow.	It	endeavours	to	understand	a	parameter’s	value	being	sensitive	or	insensitive	to	other	parameters’	values,	in	terms	of	the	values’	functional	dependences---and	so	apparently	without	regard	to	probability.	As	Hossenfelder	explains	(pp.	42-48):	we	envisage	a	space	of	theories,	where	each	theory	is	identified	by,	roughly	speaking,	the	set	of	parameters	such	as	coupling	constants	that	occur	in	its	Lagrangian	(or	Hamiltonian).	One	then	imagines	proceeding	along	a	curve	in	the	space	of	theories,	from	theories	describing	high-energy,	short-distance,	physics	to	theories	describing	low-energy,	long-distance,	physics.	This	is	done,	in	effect,	
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by	integrating	out	successively	more	high-energy	modes	of	the	fields.	Traversing	such	a	curve	is	called	‘following	the	renormalization	group	flow’.	The	question	arises:	do	the	curves,	along	which	one	proceeds,	diverge	or	converge?		If	they	diverge,	that	means	that	small	differences	in	the	parameters	of	the	high-energy	theory	one	started	from	engender	large	differences	in	the	parameters	of	the	low-energy	theory	one	arrives	at.	That	is:	divergence	means	the	low-energy	physics,	i.e.	the	physics	we	can	now	observe,	is	extremely	sensitive	to	the	values	of	parameters	describing	high-energy	physics,	i.e.	the	physics	we	cannot	now,	and	might	never,	observe.	So	divergence	means	fine-tuning:	bad	news.		Convergence,	on	the	other	hand,	would	mean	that	the	values	of	parameters	describing	low-energy	physics	are	robust	to	variations	in	high-energy	physics.	This	suggests	the	values	are	‘not	a	coincidence’:	good	news.			I	said	that	my	list,	(i)	to	(iii),	would	proceed	in	order	of	increasing	precision,	and	perhaps	plausibility.			It	is	clear	that	(i)	is	vague,	and	perhaps	unpersuasive.	The	point	here	is	not	just	that,	after	all,	explanation	has	to	come	to	an	end	somewhere.	There	is	also	a	more	specific	point.	Someone	(like	myself)	who	follows	David	Hume	in	taking	laws	of	nature	to	be	what	Hume	called	‘constant	conjunctions’---i.e.	contingent	global	patterns	of	co-instantiation	of	properties---accepts	that	any	explanation,	even	when	it	appeals	to	something	as	fundamental	as	laws	of	nature,		ends	in	what	are	ultimately	‘just’	brute	facts,	or	matters	of	happenstance.	Of	course	people	differ	in	how	easily	they	accept	that	explanation	must	terminate	in	this	sort	of	way.	But	to	speak	for	myself,	as	a	Humean:	I	am	content.		 Here	I	can	make	common	cause	with	Hossenfelder---in	part.	For	this	Humean	cognitive	modesty,	this	acceptance	of	limits	to	a	rationalist	understanding	of	nature,	meshes	well	of	course	with	some	of	what	she	says	in	her	critique	of	pursuing	beauty.	Namely,	when	she	urges	(cf.	Section	4)	that	rationalist,	even	a	priori,	speculations	like	Eddington’s	‘Fundamental	Theory’	being	beautiful	(or	elegant	etc.)	gives	us	no	reason	to	believe	them	to	be	true.		But	this	returns	us	to	my	second	disagreement	in	Section	2.	For	I	think	the	great	majority	of	physicists---indeed	all	right-minded	folk!---would	concur.	They	are	more	modest---less	gung-ho,	and	less	naïve---about	beauty	etc.	as	a	guide	to	truth,	than	Hossenfelder	portrays	them	as	being.	Indeed,	one	sees	this	in	the	book.	For	sometimes	Hossenfelder’s	interviewees	avow	scepticism	about	whether	nature	must	turn	out	to	be	rational,	or	comprehensible,	or	‘not	happenstance’:	for	example,	Arkani-Hamed---though	he	says	it	with	expletives,	rather	than	philosophical	jargon	(p.	75).			So	much	for	(i).	But	you	should	also	have	misgivings	about	the	more	precise	proposals,	(ii)	and	(iii).	And	you	should	do	so,	even	if	you	are	not	a	Humean;	but	instead,	full	of	confidence	and	ambition	about	our	ability	to	rationally	understand	nature.	Thus	I	noted	that	(ii)’s	main	idea,	of	a	suspiciously	small	vs.	a	moderate	or	large	difference	of	real	numbers	(i.e.	a	short	vs.	a	long	interval	of	real	numbers)	leads	in	to	(iii).	For	(iii)	tries	to	make	that	idea	precise	as,	essentially:	either	
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small	vs.	moderate-to-large	probability,	or	dependence	on	small	differences	at	high	energy	vs.	dependence	only	on	large	differences	at	high	energy.		But	the	common	theme	here---a	small	vs.	large	contrast---is	all	too	liable	to	be	a	matter	of	subjective	judgment:	where	(as	I	said	in	Section	2)	the	subjectivity	at	issue	is	usually,	not	of	an	individual,	but	of	a	scientific	community.	For	judgments	of	small	vs.	large	might	well	be	influenced	by	our	background	theoretical	beliefs	(and	thus	by	our	historical	circumstances)..	Thus	recall	questions	(a)	and	(c)	in	the	first,	probabilistic,	scheme	in	(iii);	and	similarly	in	the	second	scheme,	appealing	to	the	renormalization	group	flow.	Here	also,	one	can---and	should---press	the	point:	what	counts	as	a	small	or	large	difference	in	a	parameter’s	value	in	the	high	energy	regime	is	very	likely	to	be	influenced	by	theoretical	beliefs.		And	similarly	for	naturalness	proposals	that	combine	the	two	schemes	(as	some	do:	p.	47)	by	proposing	a	probability	distribution	over	parameters’	values	in	the	high	energy	regime,	and	analyzing	its	flow	down	to	low	energy.	One	can---and	should---press	the	question:	what	justifies	the	measure?		To	sum	up:	I	endorse	Hossenfelder’s	summing	up	of	these	misgivings:	‘the	issue	of	…		naturalness	shows	that	we	do	not	understand	what	it	means	for	a	law	of	nature	to	be	probable’	(pp.	208-209).	Indeed:	we	shall	see	the	misgivings	above,	i.e.	the	danger	that	naturalness	arguments	are	infected	by	subjectivity,	in	the	next	Section’s	historical	examples.				
6.	Tycho	Brahe	and	Aristotle		I	turn	to	two	examples	of	arguments	based	on	naturalness,	from	Renaissance	and	ancient	science.	The	first	is	Tycho	Brahe’s	argument	against	the	heliocentric	system:	Hossenfelder	expounds	it	on	pp.	75-77.	The	second	is	Aristotle’s	argument,	in	De	Anima,	that	light	cannot	be	any	sort	of	propagation.		Both	arguments	are	plausible,	even	impressive:	though	that	is	hardly	surprising,	given	their	authors’	supreme	brilliance.		But	both	arguments	are	wrong.	For	they	turn	on	rejecting	as	unimaginable,	and	so	unacceptable,	a	very	large	value	of	a	physical	parameter:	in	Brahe’s	case,	a	distance;	and	in	Aristotle’s	case,	a	speed.	But	so	much	for	human	imagination!	For	in	fact,	the	parameters	take	those	very	large	values.				Thus	Brahe	rejected	the	heliocentric	system	on	the	grounds	that	the	stars	appear	fixed.	If	the	Earth	goes	round	the	Sun,	then	there	should	be	stellar	parallax:	that	is,	the	stars’	apparent	positions	should	change	in	the	course	of	the	year.	Indeed	they	do.	But	the	stars	are	so	distant	that	the	effect	was	too	small	for	astronomers	to	measure,	until	the	nineteenth	century.	After	all,	our	closest	star,	Proxima	Centauri,	is	4.2	light-years	away:	which	is	about	30,000	times	more	distant	than	the	planets.	However,	the	idea	that	the	stars	are	several	orders	of	magnitude	further	from	us	than	are	the	planets	was,	in	the	sixteenth	century,	unacceptable.	Besides,	as	Hossenfelder	explains,	the	situation	had	another	confusing	feature.	Namely:	sixteenth	century	astronomers	over-estimated	stars’	size,	so	that	supposing	them	to	be	very	far	away	also	implied	that	they	were	much	larger---
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unacceptably	larger---than	the	Sun.		Thus	she	quotes	(p.	77)	Brahe	writing	in	1602:			 ‘it	is	necessary	to	preserve	in	these	matters	some	decent	proportion,	lest	things	reach	out	to	infinity	and		the	just	symmetry	of	creatures	and	visible	things	concerning	size	and	distance	be	abandoned:	it	is	necessary	to	preserve	this	symmetry	because	God,	the	author	of	the	universe,	loves	appropriate	order,	not	confusion	and	disorder’.			Noble	sentiments---but	wrong.		Similarly	two	millennia	earlier.	Aristotle	in	the	De	Anima	argues	that	light	is---not	a	propagation	of	anything	at	all	(whether	rays	or	waves	or	particles),	but	rather---the	transparency	of	the	medium	(typically	air,	of	course).	He	gives	as	his	reason	the	fact	that	at	sunrise	the	entire	landscape	is	illuminated	at	once.	Thus	he	rejects	a	propagation	travelling	so	fast	over	the	miles-wide	landscape,	as	to	look	to	us	as	if	it	arrives	everywhere	simultaneously.	Such	a	propagation	would	be	`unimaginably	fast'	in	the	literal	sense:	it	is	unimaginable,	and	accordingly	to	be	rejected.	Thus	he	writes:		 `Empedocles	(and	with	him	all	others	who	used	the	same	forms	of	expression)	was	wrong	in	speaking	of	light	as	'travelling'	or	being	at	a	given	moment	between	the	earth	and	its	envelope,	its	movement	being	unobservable	by	us;	that	view	is	contrary	both	to	the	clear	evidence	of	argument	and	to	the	observed	facts;	if	the	distance	traversed	were	short,	the	movement	might	have	been	unobservable,	but	where	the	distance	is	from	extreme	East	to	extreme	West,	the	draught	upon	our	powers	of	belief	is	too	great.'	(De	Anima,	Book	2,	Chapter	7	(418b21-26:	translated	by	J.A.	Smith)		So	here	we	have	two	arguments	whose	gist	is:	‘it	must	be	so,	since	otherwise		some	physical	parameter	would	have	an	unacceptably	vast	value’.	They	are	both	logically	valid;	and	their	premises	were,	at	the	time,	plausible	and	even	compelling.	But	in	fact:	the	stars	are	implausibly---‘unimaginably’---distant;	and	the	speed	of	light	is	unimaginably	fast.		The	moral	is	as	Hossenfelder	stressed	above;	and	I	think,	as	all	should	agree	with;	and	as	we	also	saw	in	Weinberg’s	example	(p.	110)	of	Kepler’s	trying	to	explain	the	relative	sizes	of	the	planets’	orbits	by	interpolating	Platonic	solids.		Namely:	what	we	find	plausible	or	acceptable	is	strongly	influenced	by	our	background	theoretical	beliefs,	and	thus	by	our	historical	circumstances.	And	so	we	would	do	well	to	interrogate	those	background	beliefs---advice	I	will	return	to	in	Section	9.			
7.	The	trouble	about	the	Higgs	mass	
	As	I	said	at	the	end	of	Section	4:	the	main	connection	between	supersymmetry	and	naturalness,	expounded	by	Hossenfelder,	concerns	the	mass	of	the	Higgs	boson.		
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I	shall	not	linger	on	the	advanced	physics	of	this,	which	is	beyond	my	ken.	(For	a	philosophical	exposition,	cf.	Williams	(2015,	Section	2,	3;	2018	Section	2.)	I	will	only	quote	two	passages	showing	how	well	Hossenfelder	explains	the	issues.	Namely:	first,	how	the	Higgs’s	mass	connects	supersymmetry	and	naturalness;	and	second,	what	the	implied	scientific,	indeed	empirical,	problem	is.	About	the	first	topic,	she	writes	(pp.	37-38):			 ‘The	Higgs	…	suffers	from	a	peculiar	mathematical	problem	that	the	other	elementary	particles	are	immune	to:	quantum	fluctuations	make	a	huge	contribution	to	the	Higgs’s	mass.	Contributions	like	this	are	normally	small,	but	for	the	Higgs	they	lead	to	a	mass	much	larger	than	what	is	observed---too	large,	indeed,	by	a	factor	of	10^{14}.	Not	a	little	bit	off,	but	dramatically,	inadmissibly,	wrong.	…	One	can	amend	the	theory	by	subtracting	a	term	so	that	the	remaining	difference	gives	the	mass	we	observe.	This	amendment	is	possible	because	neither	of	the	terms	is	separately	measurable;	only	their	difference	is.	Doing	this,	however,	requires	that	the	subtracted	term	be	delicately	chosen	to	almost,	but	not	exactly,	cancel	the	contribution	from	the	quantum	fluctuations.	For	this	delicate	cancellation	one	needs	a	number	identical	to	that	generated	by	the	quantum	fluctuations	for	fourteen	digits,	and	then	different	in	the	fifteenth	digit.	But	that	such	a	close	pair	of	numbers	would	come	about	by	chance	seems	highly	unlikely.		.	.	.		Supersymmetry	much	improves	the	situation	because	it	prevents	the	overly	large	contributions	from	quantum	fluctuations	to	the	Higgs	mass.	It	does	so	by	enforcing	the	required	delicate	cancellations	of	large	contributions	without	the	need	to	fine-tune.	Instead	there	are	only	more	moderate	contributions	from	the	masses	of	the	superpartners.	Assuming	all	masses	are	natural	then	implies	that	the	first	superpartners	should	appear	not	too	far	away	from	the	Higgs	itself.	That’s	because	if	the	superpartners	are	much	heavier	than	the	Higgs,	their	contribution	must	be	cancelled	by	a	fine-tuned	term	to	give	a	smaller	Higgs	mass.	And	while	that	is	possible,	it	seems	absurd	to	fine-tune	SUSY,	since	one	of	the	main	motivations	for	SUSY	is	that	it	avoids	fine-tuning.’			In	short:	SUSY	helps	the	Higgs’	mass	to	be	natural.			So	one	asks:	what	is	the	scientific	problem	about	the	Higgs	mass?	The	answer	lies	in	the	last	part	of	the	quotation	just	given.	Namely:	the	Higgs	has	been	observed	at	the	LHC,	with	a	mass	of	125	GeV---but	supersymmetry	has	not	been	observed	at,	or	close	to,	that	energy.	Nor	has	it	been	observed	at	any	energy;	(in	the	LHC’s	second	run,	from	early	2015	to	late	2018,	the	energy	was	13	TeV.)		As	Hossenfelder	says:	‘[if]	all	masses	are	natural	then	…	the	first	superpartners	should	appear	not	too	far	away	from	the	Higgs	itself.’	Or	to	quote	Gordy	Kane’s	prediction,	back	in	2001:	‘the	superpartner	masses	cannot	be	very	much	larger	than	the	Z-boson	mass,	if	this	whole	approach	is	valid’	(p.	36).	This	and	similar	predictions	(p.	39)	have	proven	false.		One	could	of	course	interpret	this	situation	as	illustrating	that	naturalness,	as	made	precise	in	the	relevant	supersymmetric	models,	has	the	
merit	of	being	falsifiable---indeed	falsified.	But	Hossenfelder	rejects	any	such	
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Popperian	or	falsificationist	glee	at	experiment	having	killed	yet	another	theory.	Instead	she	concludes	(p.	39):	‘we	know	now	that	if	the	superpartners	exist,	their	masses	must	be	fine-tuned.	Naturalness,	it	seems,	is	just	not	correct.	[This]	has	left	particle	physicists	at	a	loss	for	how	to	proceed.	Their	most	trusted	guide	appears	to	have	failed	them.’		Later,	she	again	sums	up	this	scientific,	indeed	empirical,	problem.	She	writes	(pp.	63-64):			 ‘The	LHC	eventually	confirmed	the	Higgs	with	a	mass	of	125	GeV,	just	on	the	upper	edge	of	the	range	that	had	so	far	not	been	excluded.	A	heavier	Higgs	allows	heavier	superpartners,	so	as	far	as	supersymmetry	is	concerned,	the	heavier	the	Higgs,	the	better.	But	the	fact	that	no	superpartner	has	yet	been	found	means	that	such	a	superpartner	would	have	to	be	so	heavy	that	the	measured	Higgs	mass	could	only	be	achieved	by	fine-tuning	the	parameters	of	the	supersymmetric	models.’		
	So	Hossenfelder	construes	the	falsification	of	these	specific	versions	of	naturalness	as	illustrating	her	main	theme.	As	I	summarized	it	in	Section	4	(and	endorsed	it):	judgments	of	beauty,	simplicity	etc.	are	of	limited	value	since	they	are:	(i)	historically	conditioned	(ii)	fallible	and	(iii)	without	any	secure	connection	to	the	theory	in	question	being	true.	Thus	she	adds,	just	after	this	quote,	a	remark	by	Keith	Olive:	‘So	now	we	know	there	is	some	fine-tuning.	And	that	itself	becomes	a	very	subjective	issue.	How	bad	is	the	fine-tuning?’			
8.	The	multiverse			So	much	by	way	of	discussing	supersymmetry	and	naturalness.	I	turn	to	the	third	main	topic	of	Hossenfelder’s	critique	of	the	content	of	current	fundamental	physics:	the	multiverse.	Hossenfelder’s	discussion	is	in	two	parts:	the	first	part	of	her	interview	with	Weinberg		(pp.	100-116),	the	end	of	which	covers	his	influential	anthropic	prediction	of	the	value	of	the	cosmological	constant;	and	her	interview	with	Ellis		(pp.	209-218).	By	‘multiverse’,	I	principally	mean	the	multiverse	of	modern	cosmology:	not	the	multiverse	of	the	Everett,	or	many	worlds,	interpretation	of	quantum	theory---though	I	will	touch	on	the	latter,	here	and	in	Section	9.	As	we	will	see,	the	multiverse	is	connected	with	the	topics	of	supersymmetry	and	naturalness.				Modern	cosmology	postulates	that	the	very	early	universe	underwent	a	very	brief	epoch	of	accelerating	expansion:	dubbed	‘inflation’.	This	inflationary	epoch	preceded	the	slowing	expansion	successfully	described	by	the	standard	Big	Bang	cosmology	that	was	established	in	the	mid	1970s.	(Recall	Section	3’s	discussion	of	modern	physics	being	a	victim	of	own	success.)	This	accelerating	epoch	is	very	conjectural.	It	is,	however,	supported	by	the	fact	that	it	implies	features	of	the	cosmic	microwave	background	that	are	confirmed	by	observations	like	that	of	the	COBE	and	Planck	satellites.	The	epoch	is	meant	to	have	occurred	at	times	that	are	(logarithmically!)	much	earlier---energies	much	higher,	temperatures	much	hotter---than	established	physics	can	describe.	Thus	it	is	said	to	have	begun	at	about	5	x	10-35	seconds	after	the	Big	Bang,	with	a	characteristic	expansion	time	(i.e.	the	time-scale	on	which	the	scale	
	 14	
factor---the	radius	of	the	universe---is	multiplied	by	e)	of	about	10-36	seconds;	and	to	have	ended	at	about	10-34	seconds.	This	is	a	time	corresponding	to	GUT-scale	energies,	viz.	1015	GeV;	so	that	the	temperature	was	1028	K.	These	figures	imply	expansion	by	a	factor	of	about	e50:	which	is	about	1022!	The	putative	mechanism	driving	inflation	is	yet	more	conjectural.	The	main	proposed	ingredient	is	a	so-far	unidentified	field,	called	the	inflaton.	There	are	many	models,	with	different	details	(e.g.	potentials	for	the	inflaton).	But	many	such	models	give	rise	to	a	multiverse.	That	is:	to	a	vast	set	of	(non-interacting)	pocket	or	bubble	universes---of	which	our	own	universe	is	therefore	just	one.	Besides,	these	bubble	universes	will	vary,	not	just	in	details,	but	also	in	the	values	of	fundamental	physical	parameters	such	as	the	cosmological	constant,	and	also	perhaps	the	constants	governing	the	strengths	of	the	non-gravitational	forces,	such	as	the	fine	structure	constant.	This	is	the	cosmological	
multiverse.		Here,	there	is	a	confluence	with	developments	in	the	last	twenty	years	within	string	theory.	Back	in	the	1980s,	string	theorists	hoped	the	constraints	on	constructing	a	consistent	string	theory	would	be	so	strong	that	there	would	be	a	unique	consistent	string	theory;	or	at	least,	only	a	few	such.	This	hope	was	ambitious.	For	the	sense	of	‘theory’	at	issue	here	is	more	specific	than	a	‘framework	theory’	like,	say,	elementary	classical	or	quantum	mechanics,	with	their	‘silence’	or	‘generality’	about	the	system’s	degrees	of	freedom	and	the	forces	impressed	on	it	(i.e.	its	Hamiltonian	or	Lagrangian).	Here,	‘a	string	theory’	is	not	silent	in	this	sense.	It	is	to	encode	the	forces,	i.e.	a	Hamiltonian;	and	thereby	a	ground	state.		But	this	hope	has	been	dashed.	In	the	last	twenty	years,	it	has	turned	out	that	string	theory	admits	a	vast	number	of	local	ground	states	(metastable	vacua):	states	that	are	in	a	local	minimum	of	the	potential.	A	truly	vast	number:	an	estimate	often	cited	is	10500,	while	Taylor	and	Wang’s	(2015)	estimate	is	10272,000---daunting,	indeed	depressing,	numbers.	The	‘towers’	of	excited	states	built	up	from	each	such	ground	state	would	then	count	as	different	string	theories.	This	is	the	string	theory	landscape.	Besides,	the	overall	scheme	of	string	theory	suggests	that	the	different	theories---the	towers	of	excited	states---differ	in	values	of	fundamental	physical	parameters,	such	as	the	cosmological	constant	and	the	fine	structure	constant.		So	here	is	the	confluence	with	the	cosmological	multiverse.	For	in	both	cases,	we	are	confronted	with	a	vast	population	of	what	one	might	(to	choose	a	neutral	word)	call	‘domains’:	domains	that	vary	in	fundamental	parameters.		Furthermore,	this	confluence	is	strengthened	by	a	widespread,	albeit	usually	implicit,	adoption	by	string	theorists	of	the	Everett	interpretation	of	quantum	theory.	For	the	idea	of	the	cosmological	multiverse	is	that	the	countless	domains	are	all	equally	real.	I	did	not	stress	this	above.	For	one	takes	it	in	one’s	stride,	when	reading	the	words	‘there	is	a	set	of	bubble	universes,	of	which	our	own	universe	is	just	one’.		But	the	idea	is	clear:	the	domains	are	‘just’	different	regions---different	‘parishes’---of	a	vast	actuality	with	an	intricate	spatiotemporal	and	causal	structure.		But	according	to	the	Everett	interpretation,	one	can	say	the	same	about	the	various	towers	of	excited	states	built	up	from	the	various	vacua	in	the	string	theory	landscape.	That	is:	suppose	that	the	quantum	state	of	the	entire	cosmos	is	some	sort	of	sum,	or	integral,	of	states	in	the	various	different	towers	(or	a	sum	
	 15	
of	tensor	products	of	such);	or	is	a	mixture,	i.e.	density	matrix,	with	these	as	components.	Then	there	is,	in	Everettian	parlance,	an	amplitude	for	various	branches	associated	with	various	different	vacua:	or	more	precisely,	associated	with	excitations	above	various	different	vacua.	So	there	is	an	amplitude	for	various	different	values	of	fundamental	parameters.	And	according	to	the	Everettian,	the	different	branches	are	equally	real:		just	as,	we	saw,	the	countless	domains	of	the	cosmological	multiverse	are	meant	to	be.			So	much	by	way	of	describing	the	dizzying	vision	of	the	multiverse,	cosmological	and	string-theoretic.	This	brief	description	raises	a	host	of	questions,	both	technical	and	philosophical.	Hossenfelder,	with	her	interviewees	Weinberg	and	Ellis	(pp.	100-116,	209-218),	explores	the	latter.	As	will	I,	in	this	Section	and	the	next.		 As	I	see	matters,	there	are	two	main	philosophical	questions	to	consider,	as	follows.	(For	more	discussion,	cf.	e.g.	Azhar	and	Butterfield	(2018).)	I	will	take	them	in	turn.	(1):	How,	if	at	all,	can	we	confirm	(or	disconfirm)	a	theory	postulating	such	a	multiverse,	since	we	can	only	observe	our	own	domain---our	own	‘parish’?		This	question	is	urgent	since	it	is	a	treasured	hallmark	of	science	that	we	should	be	able	to	confirm	(or	disconfirm)	our	claims:	a	treasure	we	are	in	danger	of	losing.	(Cf.	Ellis	and	Silk	(2014),	who	also	discuss	string	theory.)	This	question	will	also	lead	in	to	the	second	question.		(2):	What	does	it	take	to	explain	the	value	of	a	fundamental	physical	parameter,	such	as	the	cosmological	or	fine	structure	constant?	Indeed,	what	does	it	even	mean	to	explain	this?	In	a	moment,	we	will	see	two	more	precise	versions	of	this	latter	question.		As	to	(1),	the	obvious	approach	is	to	say	that	a	cosmological	theory	may	assign	differing	probabilities	to	various	values	of	an	observable	parameter,	of	which	each	domain	exhibits	one	value;	and	that	this	enables	us	to	assess	the	theory	by	orthodox	statistical	inference.	Namely:	the	observed	value	should	not	be	too	much	of	an	outlier:	not	too	much	‘in	the	tail’	of	the	probability	distribution.	That	is:	if	the	observed	value	is	in	the	tail,	we	will	conclude	that	the	theory	is	disconfirmed.		Admittedly,	this	approach	raises	again	the	usual	questions	about	making	precise,	and	justifying,	one’s	procedures	of	statistical	inference.	Recall	questions	(a)	to	(c)	about	the	probabilistic	construal	of	naturalness,	in	(iii)	of	Section	5.		But	more	important:	in	the	present	cosmological	setting,	this	approach	faces	two	big	problems;	(the	second	in	the	next	Section).	Each	will	lead	to	a	version	of	question	(2)	above.		The	first	problem	is:	Whence	the	probability	distribution	which	this	approach	invokes?	It	does	not	help	to	say	‘from	our	cosmological	theory’;	or	even	to	say,	apparently	more	specifically,	‘from	the	usual	Born-rule	probabilities	ascribed	by	a	quantum	(say	string-theoretic)	state	of	the	cosmos’.	For	we	do	not	have	such	a	theory,	or	such	a	state,	from	which	we	can	even	in	principle	calculate	a	distribution.			And	even	if	we	could	calculate	one,	a	nagging	question	of	meaning	would	remain.	For	all	our	understanding	of	probability	derives	from	cases	where	there	
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are	many	systems	(coins,	dice	…	or	laboratory	systems)	that	are,	or	are	believed	to	be,	suitably	similar.	And	this	puts	us	at	a	loss	to	say	what	‘the	probability	of	a	cosmos’,	or	similar	phrases	like	‘the	probability	of	a	state	of	the	universe’,	or	‘the	probability	of	a	value	of	a	fundamental	parameter’	really	mean.	This	is	in	effect	an	aggravated	version	of	question	(c),	about	the	probabilistic	construal	of	naturalness,	in	(iii)	of	Section	5.	Namely:	‘What	is	the	meaning	of	probability?’	To	sum	up:	we	must	recognize	that	Hossenfelder’s	Section-title,	‘Cosmic	poker’	(pp.	107,	112)	is	a	mere	metaphor.			I	should	add	an	ancillary	remark	(which	is	not	in	Hossenfelder’s	discussion).		One	might	say	that	since	all	these	domains	of	the	multiverse,	all	these	alternative	outcomes	of	the	cosmic	distribution,	are	presumed	to	be	actual,	we	should	understand	probability	in	this	context	just	by	counting.		That	is:	why	not	take	probability	to	be	relative	proportion,	relative	frequency,	in	the	vast	actual	population	of	domains?	Agreed:	in	philosophical	discussions	of	probability,	identifying	probabilities	with	the	corresponding	actual	relative	frequencies	(called	‘naïve	frequentism’)	is	almost	always	rejected	as	simplistic.	And	no	doubt	rightly:	one	must	allow	for	stochastic	variation---for	probabilities	not	to	be	exactly	matched	by	the	frequencies	that	happen	to	occur.		But	of	course,	these	discussions	are	not	concerned	with	the	cosmos	as	a	whole,	nor	with	a	scenario	in	which	all	alternative	outcomes	of	the	distribution,	actually	occur---and	do	so	multiply.	So	perhaps,	in	this	sort	of	cosmic	scenario,	‘just	counting’	is	the	right	way	to	interpret	probability.	(This	discussion	of	course	bears	on	the	Everett	interpretation	since,	as	I	mentioned,	it	is	popular	among	string	theorists	and,	more	generally,	quantum	cosmologists.)		But	unfortunately:	even	if	‘just	counting’	is	right,	we	are	really	no	further	ahead.	For	we	still	have	no	idea	at	all	how	to	calculate	any	such	relative	frequencies.	The	problem	is	partly	that	often	the	sets	to	be	counted	are	infinite,	suggesting	a	relative	frequency	of	‘infinity/infinity’.	And	even	elementary	examples	like	the	proportion	of	odd	numbers	among	the	natural	numbers	(Guth	2007,	p.	6820)	show	the	ambiguities	of	prescriptions	for	getting	a	finite	answer.					
9.	Biased	sampling		There	is	also	a	second	problem	with	what	I	called	‘the	obvious	approach’	of	applying	statistical	inference	to	the	observed	value	of	parameters	like	the	cosmological	constant	or	the	fine	structure	constant.		Namely,	the	danger	of	biased	sampling;	or	in	other	jargon,	selection	effects.	The	issue	is	familiar	in	everyday	life,	and	is	vividly	illustrated	by	Eddington’s	(1939)	metaphor	of	the	fishing	net.	Fishermen	whose	net	has	a	mesh	of	say	10	centimetres	should	not	infer,	from	observing	that	all	the	fish	in	their	catch	are	longer	than	10	centimetres,	that	the	fish	in	the	lake	are	also	longer	than	10	centimetres.		Similarly	for	the	cosmological	multiverse.	We	observers	are	like	fishermen.	Our	observations	of	a	physical	parameter	(e.g.	the	cosmological	constant)	are	like	measurements	of	the	length	of	fish	in	the	catch.	And	we	should	not	infer	that	in	unobserved	domains---in	domains	other	than	ours---the	
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parameter	takes,	or	is	likely	to	take,	a	value	close	to	what	we	observe.	For	maybe	the	parameter’s	value	is	correlated	with	whether	the	domain	has	observers	in	it.	The	point	has	been	well	expressed	by	Hartle,	Hertog	and	Wilczek,	as	follows.		‘What	is	most	probable	to	occur	is	not	necessarily	what	is	most	probable	to	be	observed’	(Hartle	and	Hertog	2017,	p.	182);	and:	‘Observers	are	located	only	in	places	with	special	properties.	As	a	trivial	consequence,	probabilities	conditioned	on	the	presence	of	observers	will	differ	grossly	from	probabilities	per	unit	volume’	(Wilczek	2007,	p.	43).		 In	short:	Our	expectations	about	what	we	observe	should	be	conditioned	on	what	we	believe	about	our	process	of	observation.	Agreed:	within	physics,	biased	sampling	is	usually	not	a	significant	danger.	If	the	observational	process	is	in	fact	biased---i.e.	the	value	of	the	parameter	we	wish	to	observe	is	correlated	with	the	process---we	can	usually	recognize	this	and	compensate	for	the	bias.	That	is:	we	can	quantify	the	amount	of	correlation,	and	accordingly	adjust	our	estimate	of	the	value	concerned.		But	for	the	observation	of	fundamental	parameters	in	the	context	of	the	multiverse,	biassed	sampling	threatens	to	be	a	significant	danger---and	one	that	it	is	very	hard	to	be	quantitatively	precise	about.		The	reason	lies	in	the	fact	that	parameters	like	the	cosmological	constant	or	the	fine	structure	constant	are	correlated	with	various	different	aspects	of	our	making	observations.	Besides,	these	correlations	are	often	numerically	very	sensitive.	A	small	change	in	the	parameter	would	make	an	enormous	change	to	the	observational	process,	including	whether	there	was	an	observation	at	all.	Hence	the	jargon	of	fine-tuning;	(meaning,	as	in	Sections	5	and	6,	the	opposite	of	naturalness).			And	furthermore,	these	correlations	often	involve	various	different	mechanisms,	which	are	related	to	one	another.		For	example,	there	are	many	different	necessary	conditions,	each	scientifically	describable,	of	our	observing	the	value	of	the	fine	structure	constant.	The	observer	is	alive;	and	life	requires---one	may	well	argue---complex	carbon	chemistry.	Carbon	requires	stellar	nucleosynthesis.	And	the	complex	chemistry	of	life	requires---one	may	argue---	that	a	planet	orbit	a	star	at	a	suitable	distance	(neither	too	hot	nor	too	cold,	like	Goldilocks’	porridge!),	and	for	a	long	enough	time,	that	life	can	evolve.		All	these	correlations,	and	the	mechanisms	underpinning	them,	and	these	mechanisms’	mutual	relations,	are	ferociously	hard	to	disentangle.	And	this	is	so	even	if	we	somehow	settle	on	some	exact	definition	of	‘observation’	or	‘life’;	and	it	is	so	even	for	a	single	parameter	such	the	fine	structure	constant,	let	alone	all	the	physical	parameters	of	interest.		Agreed:	these	are	well-established	problems.	The	locus	classicus	(which	Hossenfelder	of	course	cites)	is	Barrow	and	Tipler’s	superb	book,	The	Anthropic	
Cosmological	Principle	(1986).	But	they	remain	as	important	today	as	they	were	thirty	years	ago,	not	least	because	they	are	made	acute	and	vivid	by	the	cosmological	multiverse	and	the	string-theory	landscape.	Besides,	attempts	to	address	them	continue.		One	influential	example,	perhaps	the	most	famous	example,	is	Weinberg’s	explanation	of	the	value	of	the	cosmological	constant	as	an	observation	selection	effect.	Despite	the	complexities	just	mentioned,	this	example	is	comparatively	straightforward	to	calculate:	as	Weinberg	recognized.	For	the	requirement	that	life	evolves	in	an	expanding	universe	of	the	(‘FRW’)	type	usually	considered	in	
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cosmology	seems	to	be	correlated	with	the	value	of	the	cosmological	constant	by	a	single,	and	comparatively	simple,	mechanism.	Thus	Weinberg	writes:		 …	in	a	continually	expanding	universe,	the	cosmological	constant	(unlike	charges,	masses,		etc.)	can	affect	the	evolution	of	life	in	only	one	way.	Without	undue	anthropocentrism,	it	seems	safe	to	assume	that	in	order	for	any	sort	of	life	to	arise	in	an	initially	homogeneous	and	isotropic	universe,	it	is	necessary	for	sufficiently	large	gravitationally	bound	systems	to	form	first	.	.	.	However,	once	a	sufficiently	large	gravitationally	bound	system	has	formed,	a	cosmological	constant	would	have	no	further	effect	on	its	dynamics,	or	on	the	eventual	evolution	of	life	(1987,	2607-2608;	cf.	also	1989,	p.	7).		Thus	the	idea	is	that	the	evolution	of	life	constrains	the	cosmological	constant	in	a	simple	way,	because	we	can	think	of	(a	positive	value	of)	the	constant	as	a	long-range	repulsive	(‘anti-gravity’)	force.	Thus	one	assumes	that	(i)	life	can	only	exist	on	planets,	and	(ii)	life	takes	a	long	time,	say	billions	of	years,	to	evolve.	Since	(i)	requires	that	matter	has	the	chance	to	clump	together	under	gravity	so	as	to	form	planets,	the	initial	expansion	cannot	be	too	powerful.	That	is,	there	is	an	upper	bound	on	the	cosmological	constant.	On	the	other	hand,	(ii)	means	that	the	universe	must	last	long	enough	for	life	to	evolve.	So	gravity	cannot	be	so	powerful	(the	initial	expansion	cannot	be	so	weak)	that	gravity	overcomes	the	initial	expansion	in	a	Big	Crunch,	well	before	life	has	time	enough	to	evolve.		Indeed,	the	calculation	along	these	lines	in	1997,	by	Weinberg	and	his	co-authors,	amounted	to	a	prediction	that	the	cosmological	constant	was	positive.	(Cf.	Martel	et	al.	(1997),	which	built	on	previous	work,	such	as	Weinberg	(1987,	1989	Section	V);	Vilenkin	(2007)	is	a	fine	review	of	the	conceptual	issues.)		The	positive	value	was	only	measured	in	the	following	year:	(though	there	had	been	earlier	hints).		Weinberg,	in	his	interview	with	Hossenfelder,	takes	up	this	example.	His	comment	can	serve	to	summarize	our	discussion	of	selection	effects.	He	says	(p.	116):		 ‘We	assumed	the	probability	distribution	was	completely	flat,	that	all	values	of	the	constant	are	equally	likely.	Then	we	said,	‘What	we	see	is	biased	because	it	has	to	have	a	value	that	allows	for	the	evolution	of	life.	So	what	is	the	biased	probability	distribution?’	And	we	calculated	the	curve	for	the	probability	and	asked	‘Where	is	the	maximum?	What	is	the	most	likely	value?’	…	[Hossenfelder	adds:	‘the	most	likely	value	turned	out	to	be	quite	close	to	the	value	of	the	cosmological	constant	which	was	measured	a	year	later’.]		…	So	you	could	say	that	if	you	had	a	fundamental	theory	that	predicted	a	vast	number	of	individual	big	bangs	with	varying	values	of	the	dark	energy	[i.e.	cosmological	constant]	and	an	intrinsic	probability	distribution	for	the	cosmological	constant	that	is	flat	.	.	.	then	what	living	beings	would	expect	to	see	is	exactly	what	we	see.’			The	last	words	convey	the	lure	of	what	is	often	called	‘anthropic	explanation’.	But	of	course,	the	relevant	notion	in	terms	of	which	we	should	formulate	the	process	of	observation	is	not	humankind,	but	something	more	general,	such	as	
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life,	or	evolved	life.	So	rather	than	the	label	‘anthropic	explanation’,	we	should	use	a	phrase	like	‘parochial	explanation’,	i.e.	explanation	that	invokes	the	local	circumstances	of	our	‘cosmic	parish’.		Whatever	the	label,	we	face	tough	questions,	about	both	physics	and	philosophy.	As	to	physics,	I	should	mention	that	some	recent	discussions	suggest	the	string	landscape	contains	no	universes	with	a	positive	cosmological	constant.	Cf.	for	example	Woit’s	blog	http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=10486.		And	the	philosophical	question	about	explanation	is	also	tough.	Can	we	be	content,	as	Weinberg	is,	with	a	parochial	explanation	of	the	value	of	a	fundamental	physical	parameter?	Or	must	we	seek	an	explanation	invoking	more	traditional	considerations,	especially	principles	of	dynamics	and-or	symmetry?				
10.	Topics	we	woefully	neglect	
	So	much	by	way	of	expounding	the	multiverse,	and	its	connection	with	supersymmetry,	especially	string	theory,	and	naturalness.	Together,	they	form	Hossenfelder’s	three	main	charges:	her	three	main	accusations	about	how	contemporary	physics	has	taken	a	wrong	turn.		Here	we	should	again	distinguish,	as	in	Section	3,	between	a	subject	getting	stuck	and	it	taking	a	wrong	turn.	Of	course,	we	can	hardly	blame	the	physics	community	for	the	subject	being	stuck	in	the	sense	of	lacking	data.	For	example:	while	we	would	have	been	pleased	to	see	SUSY	in	the	LHC,	it	is	no	one’s	fault	that	nature	‘chose	not	to	oblige’.	Such	are	the	fortunes---oftentimes,	misfortunes---of	enquiry.		No	amount	of	high	talent	and	generous	funding	guarantees	success.		But	as	we	have	seen,	Hossenfelder	argues	that	the	physics	community	has	
erred,	not	merely	faced	misfortune:	that	physics	has	taken	a	wrong	turn.		She	sums	up	the	critique	of	the	previous	Sections	as	follows	(pp.	107-108).			 ‘The	multiverse	has	gained	in	popularity	while	naturalness	has	come	under	stress,	and	physicists	now	pitch	one	as	the	other’s	alternative.	If	we	can’t	find	a	natural	explanation	for	a	number,	so	the	argument	goes,	then	there	isn’t	any.	Just	choosing	a	parameter	is	too	ugly.	Therefore,	if	the	parameter	is	not	natural,	then	it	can	take	on	any	value,	and	for	every	possible	value	there’s	a	universe.	This	leads	to	the	bizarre	conclusion	that	if	we	don’t	see	supersymmetric	particles	at	the	LHC,	then	we	live	in	a	multiverse.		 I	can’t	believe	what	this	once-venerable	profession	has	become.	Theoretical	physicists	used	to	explain	what	was	observed.	Now	they	try	to	explain	why	they	can’t	explain	what	was	not	observed.	And	they’re	not	even	good	at	that.	In	a	multiverse,	you	can’t	explain	the	values	of	parameters;	at	best	you	can	estimate	their	likelihood.	But	there	are	many	ways	not	to	explain	something.’		Indeed,	a	cri	de	coeur.	Obviously,	the	debate	continues	about	whether	theoretical	physics	is	in	fact	in	such	a	parlous	state:	recall	my	disagreements	in	Section	2.	
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For	a	ringside	seat	at	the	debate,	note	that	the	proceedings	of	the	“Why	Trust	a	Theory?”	conference	at	Munich	in	2015	are	online:	https://www.whytrustatheory2015.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/program/index.html.)	Of	course,	that	conference	also	addresses	several	issues	I	have	not	mentioned,	including	philosophical	ones:	in	particular,	the	important	suggestion	by			Dawid	(in	his	String	Theory	and	the	Scientific	Method	(2013:	especially	Chapter	3)	that	a	theory	such	as	string	theory	can	gather	confirmation	very	indirectly,	viz.	on	account	of	our	failure,	despite	much	effort,	to	find	an	alternative	theoretical	framework.		But	even	if	one	thinks	Hossenfelder’s	critique	so	far	is	too	pessimistic,	or	unfair,	it	leads	to	another:	about	neglected	problems	and	research	programmes.		For	in	the	course	of	her	discussions	and	interviews,	Hossenfelder	also	describes	problems	that	are	perfectly	valid,	even	pressing,	but	are	neglected.	And	correspondingly,	for	research	programmes,	rather	than	problems.	There	are	programmes	that	are	perfectly	coherent,	even	promising,	but	are	unfashionable	‘underdogs’.	Thus	the	problems	go	unaddressed,	and	the	research	programmes	unfunded.		This	critique	returns	to	Section	3’s	remark	that,	as	well	as	lacking	data	at	high	energies,	we	are	in	dire	need	of	conceptual	clues	about	how	to	go	beyond	our	present	theories.	Thus	recall	the	analogy	with	the	null	result	of	the	Michelson-Morley	experiment:	maybe	some	empirical	facts	crucial	to	progress	today	are	already	to	hand,	but	our	mindset	prevents	us	recognizing	them.				 		Of	course,	people	will	differ	about	which	such	problems	and	research	programmes	should	be	pursued,	and	which	are	not	worth	the	candle.	But	Hossenfelder	makes	a	good	case	that	fundamental	physics	suffers	from	a	good	deal	too	much	conformism,	and	an	unmerited	hegemony	of	a	few	research	programmes.	And	correlatively,	there	is	far	too	little	collegial	and	liberal	encouragement	of	diverse	approaches.	This	critique,	this	accusation	of	undue	neglect,	has	two	aspects:	about	the	contents	of	the	physics	at	issue,	and	about	the	sociology	and	professional	organization	of	the	discipline.	I	will	take	them	in	turn,	in	this	Section	and	the	next.	 	Several	of	Hossenfelder’s	interviews	reveal	a	neglected	problem	or	an	underdog	research	programme;	and	some	are	mostly	about	such.	The	obvious	example	is	the	interpretation	of	quantum	theory,	especially	the	measurement	problem.	I	say	‘obvious’,	not	just	because	I	am	a	philosopher	of	physics;	nor	just	because	Hossenfelder	devotes	her	Chapter	6	to	it.	Also:	in	that	Chapter,	Weinberg,	one	of	her	most	distinguished	interviewees,	is	frank	and	forthright	in	admitting	the	problem.	For	example,	he	says:	‘we	don’t	have	any	really	satisfactory	theory	of	quantum	mechanics’	(p.	123);	and	then,	in	a	manner	reminiscent	of	John	Bell’s	famous	strictures	(e.g.	1989)	against	invoking	the	concept	of	measurement	in	the	postulates	of	a	basic	physical	theory,	he	adds	(p.	124):			‘.	.	.	it’s	a	formalism	for	calculating	probabilities	that	human	beings	get	when	they	make	certain	interventions	in	nature	we	call	experiments.	And	a	theory	should	not	refer	to	human	beings	in	its	postulates.	You	would	
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like	to	understand	macroscopic	things	like	experimental	apparatuses	and	human	beings	in	terms	of	the	underlying	theory.	You	don’t	want	to	see	them	brought	in	on	the	level	of	axioms	of	the	theory.’			(Weinberg’s	frank	admission	of	the	problem	is	developed	in	his	2017	article	in	
The	New	York	Review	of	Books.)		But	the	interpretation	of	quantum	theory,	especially	measurement,	is	by	no	means	Hossenfelder’s	only	neglected	issue.	For	example,	she	discusses	the	research	programmes	of	Alain	Connes	(pp.	157-159)	and	Xiao-Gang	Wen	(pp.	190-194).	To	pick	out	the	latter:	the	very	broad	idea	is	that	though	physicists	are	used	to	the	infinities	that	beset	quantum	field	theory	(even	the	free	theory),	they	are	a	sickness---and	quantum	field	theory’s	successes,	including	the	standard	model,	should	be	recovered	from	a	thoroughly	finitistic	basis	of	qubits.		So	much	by	way	of	examples.	Hossenfelder’s	broad	point	about	them	is	that	all	too	often,	physicists	neglect	these	problems	and	research	programmes	for	no	good	reason.	They	just	follow	the	all-too	fallible	guide	of	aesthetic	judgment,	or	current	fashion,	or	habit;	or	to	put	it	more	neutrally:	what	the	community	just	happens	to	get	interested	in.	Thus	towards	the	end	of	the	book,	she	summarizes	with	three	examples	among	those	I	have	discussed:	the	measurement	problem,	Wen’s	programme,	and	the	multiverse.	She	writes	(pp.	208-209):		‘There	just	isn’t	any	[justification	for	relying	on	beauty	in	selecting	theories].	As	much	as	I	want	to	believe	that	the	laws	of	nature	are	beautiful,	I	don’t	think	our	sense	of	beauty	is	a	good	guide;	in	contrast	it	has	distracted	us	from	other,	more	pressing	questions.	Like	the	one	that	Steven	Weinberg	pointed	out:	that	we	do	not	understand	the	emergence	of	the	macroscopic	world.	Or,	as	Xiao-Gang	Wen	reminded	me,	that	we	do	not	understand	quantum	field	theory.	Or	how	the	issue	of	the	multiverse	and	naturalness	shows	that	we	do	not	understand	what	it	means	for	a	law	of	nature	to	be	probable.’		
	
	
11.	How	to	mend	our	ways		I	turn	now	to	the	second	aspect	of	Hossenfelder’s	accusation	of	undue	neglect.	This	is	about	the	sociology	and	professional	organization	of	physics	as	a		discipline.		Agreed:	Hossenfelder’s	various	causes	for	concern	about	the	organization	of	physics	cannot	easily	be	separated	from	assessing	the	content,	and	confirmation,	of	physical	theories.	As	every	student	of	science---be	they	scientist,	philosopher,	historian	or	sociologist---will	agree:	values	and	attitudes	mingle	indissolubly	with	cognition.	So	one	could	write	a	whole	review	of	the	book,	stressing	these	concerns.	But	although	they	crop	up	throughout	the	book,	Hossenfelder	devotes	fewer	pages	to	them;	and	with	space	pressing,	I	will	follow	suit.	
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	 Hossenfelder	describes	various	incidents	or	patterns	of	communal	behavior,	that	are	undoubtedly	peculiar:	and	most	of	us	would	say,	dysfunctional---though	of	course	they	have	their	analogues	(perhaps	worse	ones)	outside	physics,	and	outside	science.		One	example	is	the	story	of	the	diphoton	anomaly.	LHC	data	from	December	2015	suggested	a	discovery	of	‘new	physics’,	i.e.	incompatibility	with	the	standard	model.	This	was	pursued	forcefully,	also	by	theorists.	For	example,	ten	papers	appeared	on	the	arxiv	a	day	after	the	first	announcement;	and	in	the	next	eight	months,	five	hundred	papers	were	written,	some	of	them	getting	three	hundred	citations.	But	eighteen	months	later,	the	anomaly	was	gone	for	good	(pp.	85,	235).	Agreed:	in	a	field	starved	of	new	data	(Section	3),	it	is	perfectly	rational	to	scrutinize	closely	a	possible	anomaly.	But	given	how	many	problems	and	research	programmes	we	neglect,	it	is	worrying	to	see	how	much	effort	went	into	explaining	a	statistical	fluctuation.	Another	example	is	the	depressing	increase	in	hype	(p.	195).	A	2015	survey	found	that	the	frequency	in	scientific	papers	of	words	such	as	‘ground-breaking’	and	‘unprecedented’	increased	in	the	forty	years	from	1974	to	2014	by	a	depressing	2500%.		(But	there	is	some	consolation	for	physics	fans.	This	survey	was	of	papers	in	biomedical	science	.	.	.		so	perhaps	that	explains	why	nowadays	biologists	seem	to	get	much	more	funding	than	physicists	…)	For	Hossenfelder,	the	main	point	of	such	examples	is	how	they	reveal	considerable	cognitive	biases	in	theoretical	physicists’	selection,	or	rejection,	of	problems,	and	correspondingly,	in	their	support	for	or	scepticism	about	research	programmes.	These	biases	are	the	main	theme	of	the	final	Chapter	(‘Knowledge	is	power’):	which	includes	a	useful	summary	of	some	ten	main	types	of	bias---useful	since	the	biases	described	are	sadly	familiar	(pp.	229-231).		‘There	is	the	sunk	cost	fallacy,	more	commonly	known	as	throwing	good	money	after	bad	…		The	in–group	bias	makes	us	think	researchers	in	our	own	field	are	more	intelligent	than	others	.	.	.	the	false	consensus	effect:	we	tend	to	overestimate	how	many	other	people	agree	with	us	and	how	much	they	do	so		.	.	.		Then	there	is	the	mother	of	all	biases,	the	bias	blind	spot---the	insistence	that	we	certainly	are	not	biased.’		So,	finally,	we	face	the	question:	what	can	we,	what	should	we,	do	about	it?		An	Appendix,	called	‘What	you	can	do	to	help’	(p.	245f.),	makes	some	dozen	recommendations,	aimed	at	three	types	of	reader	of	the	book.	Namely:	(i)	a	scientist;	(ii)	an	administrator	in	higher	education,	or	science	policy	maker,	or	representative	of	a	funding	agency;	(iii)	a	science	writer	or	member	of	the	public.	All	the	recommendations	are	reasonable,	and	doable:	and	even	if	you	disagree,	they	are	all	worth	thinking	hard	about.	Here,	to	conclude,	are	some	that	I	for	one	endorse.	For	group	(i)	i.e.	the	scientists,	the	recommendations	include:	‘Learn	about,	and	try	to	prevent,	social	and	cognitive	biases’.	For	group	(ii),	they	include:	‘Make	commitments:	you	have	to	get	over	the	idea	that	all	science	can	be	done	by	post	docs	on	two-year	Fellowships	.	.	.		short-term	funding	means	short-term	thinking’.	And:	‘Encourage	a	change	of	field:	if	the	promise	of	a	research	area	declines,	scientists	need	a	way	to	get	out	.	.	.	offer	re-education	support,	one-or	two-year	grants	that	allow	scientists	to	learn	the	basics	of	a	new	field’.	
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And	perhaps	most	uncomfortable	of	all:		For	group	(iii),	the	recommendation	is:	‘Ask	questions.	You’re	used	to	asking	about	conflicts	of	interest	due	to	funding	from	industry.	But	you	should	also	ask	about	conflicts	of	interest	due	to	short-term	grants	or	employment.	Does	the	scientist’s	future	funding	depend	on	producing	the	results	they	just	told	you	about?	…’		Here,	I	submit,	Hossenfelder	has	done	physics	and	science	more	generally---and	our	better	selves---a	service.	These	are	salutary	warnings	and	wise	counsels.	We	should	all	take	notice,	and	do	what	we	can.				
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